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may avoid a voidable marriage. It appears, with the possible single ex-
ception of insanity, that a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. A
direct proceeding is required in the case of a voidable marriage, and it
must be brought by the party defrauded or underage. In the instance of
a void marriage, jurisdiction over the person follows the common law,
but proceedings applicable to a divorce must be followed in voidable
marriages. The cases illustrate that voidable marriages may be ratified.
On the other hand, there can be no ratification of void marriages. In
the past the courts have often prevented unfortunate and needless compli-
cations by implying a valid common-law marriage. Questions concern-
ing property settlements of ostensible marriages have been answered by
characterizing the marriages as "quasi-partnerships." The children of
such marriages are by statute declared legitimate. However the legisla-
ture has not granted the courts power to grant custody of children in
annulment proceedings. Finally, the case discloses that there will be no
award of alimony in annulment proceedings, but support pendente lite
and money for adequate defense will be granted in certain instances of
a voidable marriage.
THE AVAILABILITY OF WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY IN INDIANA
Many American jurisdictions either permit or require the sending of
written instructions into the jury room in a civil trial.1 Although there
is evidence that the majority of Indiana trial courts refuse to allow this
practice,' there is neither a statutory provision nor a Supreme Court Rule
1. Tabular summary of law of other jurisdictions, Appendix I.
2. The Indiana Law Journal has conducted a survey of Indiana Circuit and Su-
perior Courts in an attempt to gather data concerning the practice of sending written
instructions to the jury room. Fifty returns were received of a total of ninety-four
questionnaires, equalling a fifty three per cent return. Below is a facsimile of the
questionnaire with the final results indicated:
In answering the following questions please assume (a) a civil jury trial (b) that
counsel has requested that the court instruct the jury in writing.
I. When may a copy of the written instructions be sent in with the jury as they retire
to the jury room? (Please check one.)
76% Never 2% Upon request of the jury
i6% With consent of both parties 4% A matter of judicial discretion
o% Upon request of either party 2% Always
II. With what frequency do the following occur? (Assume 5 jury trials as a basis,
i.e., how many out of five.)
NOTES
or judicial decision expressly governing this phase of civil procedure.
This absence of a definitive procedural rule in regard to the jury's hav-
ing the written instructions during its deliberation and the conflicting
policy considerations involved invite an investgation of the legal foun-
dation of the present Indiana procedure.
Historically, the propriety of permitting the written instructions in
the jury room presented no problem as the judge normally gave the
charge orally.8 But even if instructions had been reduced to writing, the
well settled rule of evidence prohibiting writings not under seal or not a
part of the record from being submitted to the jury would have barred
the instructions from the jury room.4 This common law restriction on
the availability of written materials in the jury room was abolished in
Indiana by statute in 1843, and discretion was given to trial courts to
(1) The jury requests that they be given a copy of the instructions.
(a) As they retire: never-98%, one out of five times-2%
(b) After they have retired: never-84%, one out of five times-i2%, two
out of five-4%
(2) Counsel requests that the jury be given a copy of the instructions as the jury
retires.
(a) Counsel for plaintiff: never-98%, one out of five times-2%
(b) Counsel for defendant: never-98%, one out of five times-2%
(3) The jury requests that they be brought into court to have the instructions or
part of the instructions explained or clarified.
(a) When the jury has not had the written instructions in the juryroom:
never-23%, less than one out of five times-27%, one out of five
times-23%, two out of five-2_r%, three out of five-6%
(b) When the jury has had the written instructions in the jury room. (Not
enough replies received to warrant any conclusions.)
The names of individual judges who supplied answers and comments appearing in this
note will remain confidential. The returns are on file in the business office of the
Indiana Law Journal. Reference to the survey will be made by the appropriate section
of the questionnaire, e.g. Survey, II (1) (a).
3. The practice of requiring the judge to reduce the charge, or portions of the
charge to writing, is a relatively modern development in trial procedure. An Indiana
statute enacted in 1843 required the court to reduce to writing any instruction to which
an objection had been entered. REv. STAT. 1843, ch. 40, § 326, p. 733. A later statute
required that special instructions submitted by the parties and the general instructions
of the court be reduced to writing if requested by either party. 2 REv. STAT. 1852, ch. 1,
§ 324, p. 110. The present practice concerning the reduction of instructions to writing
is governed by IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-2008, 2-2010 (Burns 1946) and IIn. Sup. CT.
RULE 1-7a.
Rising-Sum; Turnpike Co. v. Coiiway, 7 Ind. 149, 150 (1855), indicates that the em-
phasis on written instructions probably had its historical roots in the difficulty seventy-
five or one hundred years ago of insuring a court record for the purpose of appellate
review of the instructions. In the background of the transition from oral to written
instructions was the desire of lawyers to restrict the power of the judge to influence
the jury by his summarization of the evidence or comments on the evidence. See DEVLiN,
TRIAL BY JURY 116 (1956) (common law power of judge to summarize and comment
on the evidence).
4. The historical development and modern decline of this common law rule is dis-
cussed in THAYER, PRELIMiNARY TREATIsE ON EvIDENCE 107 (1898); 2 THoMPsoN,
TamxAs § 2574 (2d ed. 1912) ; and, Note, Right of Jury to Take Written Exhibits to
Jury Room, 73 U.S.L. REv. 121 (1939).
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determine which papers were available to the jury during its delibera-
tion.5 However, this 1843 provision was not specifically reenacted with
the promulgation of the Indiana Civil Code in 1852. Instead, the Code
apparently contained no procedural guide to aid the trial court in deter-
mining which written materials the jury might have during the course of
its deliberation.6 Two apparent alternatives were available to the courts
in interpreting this lack of legislation: Either the legislature intended
the 1843 statute to remain in effect with the result that the trial court
retained discretion in determining the availability of particular written
materials to the jury;7 or, it contemplated that the statutory void would
be filled by a system of judicial rules and precedents formulated to deal
with each category of written material. This latter alternative has been
almost uniformly accepted by Indiana appellate courts, with the result
that by judicial decision definitive rules have developed which serve as
procedural guides for trial courts in determining the availability of par-
ticular writings to the jury, such as documentary evidence, pleadings, and
statutory materials.' However, no such guide apparently exists with
5. "The court, in all trials shall have a right to determine what papers shall be
taken from the bar by the jury to their room, any former usage or law to the contrary
notwithstanding." REv. STAT. 1843, ch. 40, § 332, p. 734. As early as 1817, papers read
in evidence were made available to the jury during its deliberation. IND. LAws 1817-18,
ch. 3, § 57.
6. This absence of a statutory guide may be attributable to an oversight of the
draftsmen of the original Indiana Civil Code. The Field Code of Procedure, which ap-
peared in 1848, is generally recognized as the pattern of the Indiana Civil Code of
1852; however, the Field Code provision permitting the jury to receive all documentary
evidence except depositions was not enacted in the Indiana Civil Code.
7. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
8. E.g., it is generally held that documentary evidence should not be permitted in
the jury room over the objections of a party. See e.g., Summers v. Greathouse, 87 Ind.
205 (1882) ; Toohy v. Sarvis, 78 Ind. 474 (1881) (letter attached to deposition);
Nichols v. State, 65 Ind. 512 (1879) (several folios of charges and credits); Lotz v.
Briggs, 50 Ind. 346 (1875) (record of former action between same parties); Eden v.
Lingenfelter, 39 Ind. 19 (1872) (account books) ; Alexander v. Dunn, 5 Ind. 122 (1854)
(estimate of amount due plaintiff).
Contrary to the practice in many other states, Indiana juries may consult the plead-
ings during their deliberation. See e.g., Continental Nat. Bank v. State Bank, 199 Ind.
290, 157 N.E. 433 (1927) (jury was warned that pleadings were not evidence) ; Shulse
v. McWilliams, 104 Ind. 512, 3 N.E. 243 (1885) ; Summers v. Greathouse, 87 Ind. 205
(1882) ; Snyder v. Braden, 58 Ind. 143 (1877) ; Continental Optic Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind.
App. 643, 88 N.E.2d 55 (1949).
There is authority seemingly indicating that a document which is properly attached
to the complaint, or which could have been so attached, is available to the jury. See
e.g., McKaig v. Jordan, 172 Ind. 84, 87 N.E. 974 (1908) (viewer's reports in action to
stay approval of proposed highway) ; Guthrie v. Carpenter, 162 Ind. 417, 70 N.E. 486
(1903) (plans of building in action on building contract) ; Snyder v. Braden, 58 Ind.
143 (1877) (note sued upon) ; Collins v. Frost, 54 Ind. 242 (1876) (note sued upon) ;
Haas v. Cone Mfg. Co., 25 Ind. App. 469, 58 N.E. 499 (1900) (memo of interest due
attached to bill of particulars) ; Smith v. Thurston, 8 Ind. App. 105, 35 N.E. 520 (1893)
(note sued upon attached to complaint as an exhibit).
Minutes of the evidence may not be taken to the jury room. See e.g., Cheek v.
State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871) (notes taken by juror); Ball v. Carley, 3 Ind. 577 (1852)
NOTES
respect to written instructions. This conclusion is supported by the re-
sults of a survey of Indiana trial courts which indicates at least five dif-
ferent practices throughout the state.'
An apt illustration of the judicial approach commonly utilized in
developing these rules governing the availability of specific categories of
written materials is afforded by Eden v. Lingenfelter,0 a case involving
books of account which had been introduced as evidence. The Indiana
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that such materials were not avail-
able to the jury during its deliberation because the prevailing practice did
not permit it, and because the 1843 statute," giving the trial court dis-
cretion to send in documentary evidence, was not embodied in the Civil
Code. The reasons behind the Court's opinion were not fully developed
and lacked logical appeal. No attempt was made to evaluate competing
rules. Moreover, the Court ignored the construction provision of the
Civil Code which continued in force all laws which were not inconsistent
with the Civil Code and which would supply any omitted case.' 2 This
would have saved the provision of the 1843 statute and would have made
the submission of documentary evidence discretionary with the trial court.
Instead, the Supreme Court formulated the inflexible rule that docu-
(minutes of evidence taken by counsel); Berne Hardware Co., 64 Ind. App. 473, 116
N.E. 54 (1917) (not reversible error where defendant's attorney had notice that juror
was taking notes but did not object until verdict had been returned).
Likewise, it is error to submit to the jury a record of a former action between the
parties without permission of the court and consent of appellant. See e.g., Jones v.
State, 89 Ind. 82 (1883) (copy of Indiana Reports containing prior appeal); Ohio &
Mississippi Ry. v. Hill, 7 Ind. App. 255, 34 N.E. 646 (1893).
There is also some indication that it may be error for the jury to request and
receive a dictionary. See e.g., Indianapolis Power and Light Co. v. Moore, 103 Ind.
App. 53, 5 N.E.2d 118 (1937).
The following rules which have been developed in criminal actions may be useful
in determining the availability of analogous written material in civil trials.
Prior decisions have sustained the taking of statutory materials into the jury room.
See e.g., Posey v. State, 234 Ind. 696, 131 N.E.2d 145 (1955) ; McClanahan v. State, 233
Ind. 365, 118 N.E.2d 434 (1954) ; Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 7 N.E. 884 (1886).
Likewise, it is proper in a criminal trial to permit the jury to take with them the
affidavit or indictment; provided, however, that there is nothing of a prejudicial charac-
ter attached thereto or endorsed thereon. See e.g., Lee v. State, 213 Ind. 352, 12 N.E.2d
949 (1937) ; Middaugh v. State, 191 Ind. 373, 132 N.E. 678 (1921) ; Masterson v. State,
144 Ind. 240, 43 N.E. 138 (1895) (jury was instructed that the information was not
evidence against the defendant) ; Stout v. State, 90 Ind. 1 (1883) (indictment and all
papers attached thereto were taken to the jury room).
On the other hand it has been held to constitute misconduct of the jury where a
legal textbook was present in the jury room during the deliberation. Newkirk v. State,
27 Ind. 1 (1866) (one volume of Bishop's Criminal Law).
9. See Survey, part I.
10. 39 Ind. 19 (1872).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. "The laws and usages of this State relative to pleadings and practice in civil
actions and proceedings, not inconsistent herewith, and as far as the same may operate
in aid hereof, or to supply any omitted case, are hereby continued in force." 2 Rav. STAT.
1852, ch. 1, § 802, p. 224.
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mentary evidence must be withheld from the jury room unless both
parties consent. The Court reasoned, "This may be inferred, probably,
from the section of the code of practice . . . which provides that the
jury shall be brought into court if they disagree as to any part of the
testimony, .... "13
In subsequent cases involving documentary evidence the inference
made in the Eden case was elevated to the status of ruling precedent by a
superficial declaration that the law was "settled" and that the court "ap-
proved of this view of the law, as likely to attend, in its practical admin-
istration, with less evil than would attend the opposite rule of law on the
subject."14  No further attempts were made to explain why the section
of the Civil Code which prescribed the procedure to be followed in the
event the jury requests additional information15 should be construed as
determinative of what written materials the jury could properly have
during its deliberation. The oblique technique employed by the Court in
the Eden case, and in subsequent cases dealing with other types of writ-
ten materials, was made necessary by the Supreme Court's refusal to
allow the trial courts to exercise their discretion in placing written ma-
terials in the hands of the jury, and by an apparent compulsion to fit the
resulting piecemeal rules into some convenient niche of the existing
statutory scheme.
Although the Civil Code provision invoked in the Eden case"6 has
not been judicially construed as authority prohibiting written instructions
in the jury room, the strength of the analogy between documentary evi-
dence and written instructions may be a contributing factor behind the
predominant practice in Indiana trial courts of excluding written instruc-
tions from the jury room. However, it is more probable that the case of
Smith v. McMillen'7 most directly influences the present Indiana practice.
Indeed, the Smith case has been cited as authority for the broad proposi-
tion that it is error to permit the jury to have written instructions during
its deliberation, without consent of the parties."8 In the Smith case, the
13. The section of the code cited by the Court provides: "After the jury have
retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the
testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case,
they may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the information required
shall be given in the presence of, or atfer notice to, the parties or their attorneys."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2017 (Burns 1946).
14. Lotz v. Briggs, 50 Ind. 346 (1875) ; cf. Nichols v. State, 65 Ind. 512, 521 (1879).
15. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
16. Ibid.
17. 19 Ind. 391 (1862).
18. Gavit cites Smith v. McMillen for the following proposition: "It is misconduct
for a juror to . . . receive and use the written instructions during the deliberation. .. "
2 GAvIr, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 457 n. 4 (1942). See also 89 C.J.S., Trials
§ 468 n. 50 (1955).
NOTES
trial court permitted the jury, during the absence of one party from the
courtroom, to have the written instructions after the jury had been de-
liberating "for a long time." The Indiana Supreme Court held this to
be reversible error and remanded the cause for new trial. In the per
curiam opinion there is neither a record of who made the request, nor
any description of the form of the instructions except that they were
in writing.
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on a policy argument which
was based on the premise that not all jurors can read but all jurors can
hear. Thus, all jurors will be equal if they are forced to rely on their
memory after hearing the instructions read in the courtroom. The Court
reasoned that this was safer than allowing the literate juror to examine
and interpret instructions for the illiterate juror; thereby the possibility
that the "sharp ones" would become "interpreters for the Court and mis-
lead their less skillful fellow jurors" would be avoided.
On this basis the Indiana Supreme Court concluded broadly: "We
think instructions should not be sent to the jury room, without consent
of both parties."'" This statement, if taken at face value, appears to be
authority absolutely prohibiting the jury from having the instructions
without the consent of the parties. Indeed, this statement may account
for the position taken by many Indiana trial courts that written insruc-
tions are not available to the jury during its deliberation even though
both parties consent." However, it is submitted that the proper holding
in the Smith case is more limited.
The precise question presented by the facts in the Smith case was
whether the lower court had committed reversible error in permitting the
jury to receive the written instructions after its deliberation had com-
menced. The answer was apparent, for the procedure in question was a
clear violation of the Civil Code provision that the jury, after it retires
shall be brought into the courtroom to receive further instruction or to
have the instructions repeated, and that notice shall be given to the
parties."' However, no mention of this express statutory mandate was
made in the opinion. The Court apparently arrived at its independent
conclusion through the indirect "sharp juror" argument. Although the
conclusion reached was correct, that is, error had been committed below,
the Court failed to define the precise question before it. Instead, the
19. Six years prior to the Smith decision, the Indiana Supreme Court, while not
deciding whether in a criminal trial it was error for the jury to have the instructions,
condemned the practice as, "perhaps not very judicious." Hall v. State, 8 Ind. 439, 443
(1856).
20. See Survey, part I.
21. See note 13 supra.
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Court considered the broader issue of whether it is reversible error to
submit the instructions to the jury at any time, and did not limit its deci-
sion to that time after the jury had retired, the time existing in the fact
situation before it. Indeed, this failure to distinguish between sending
instructions to the jury room as the jury retires and after the jury has
retired may perhaps account for the Court's failure to apply the con-
trolling Civil Code provision.22
The time element is only significant because it provides a technical
means of avoiding the blanket prohibition against instructions in the jury
room which Smith v. McMillen is thought to have established. Once it
is recognized that the time element factually limits the scope of the Smith
case to that time after the jury has retired, the holding of that case simply
represents a proper, however fortutitious, application of an existing
statute."
But even though the holding in the Smith case, when limited to its
facts, does not prohibit the jury's taking written instructions as it re-
tires, the "sharp juror" policy argument employed by the Court cannot
be similarly limited by the time factor. However, the considerable de-
crease in illiteracy in Indiana since Smith v. McMillen was decided in
1862, has substantially destroyed the vitality of the argument that the
literate juror may interpret the instructions erroneously and thereby mis-
lead his illiterate fellow juror.24 Thus, the Smith case on its facts cannot
be considered as express authority prohibiting the jury from taking the
instructions to the jury room as it retires; and, the "sharp juror" policy
argument cannot be said to lend logical support to this prohibition.
But even if the Smith case can be limited in its stare decisis effect
upon Indiana trial courts in their ruling on the propriety of allowing the
jury to take in the written instructions as it retires, it would be improper
to contend that Indiana trial courts have absolute discretion to allow
22. Ibid.
23. In subsequent cases the statute which should have been invoked in the Smith
decision has been properly applied to prevent further communication by way of instruc-
tion between the court and jury except in open court and after notice has been given to
the parties. See e.g., Low v. Freeman, 117 Ind. 341, 20 N.E. 242 (1888) ; Blacketer v.
House, 67 Ind. 414, 418 (1879); Searfoss v. Grissom, 85 Ind. App. 691, 693, 155 N.E.
613, 615 (1926).
The Smith case has been cited for its proper holding that the jury may not receive
further instructions after it retires except in open court and after notice to the parties.
See e.g., Blacketer v. House, supra at 418; ABBOTT, CIVIL JURY TRIALS § 385 n. 3 (5th
ed. 1935) ; 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS § 2583 n. 84 (2nd ed. 1912).
24. In Indiana the illiteracy rate among persons twenty years old or over decreased
from 11.1% in 1860 to 2.1% in 1930. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE ABSTRACT OF THE
15TH CENSUS 290 (1933) ; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF
THE UNITED STATES, 9TH CENSUS (1870).
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2401 (Burns 1946).
NOTES
juries to take written instructions as they retire without considering other
possible legal prohibitions of this practice.
The statutory causes for new trial found under the heading of "mis-
conduct of the jury"2 or "error of law occurring at the trial"2 have been
successfully invoked to bar certain written materials from the jury
room." Howpever, it cannot be contended that the jury is guilty of mis-
conduct if the court permits the instructions to be taken as the jury retires.
Generally it is when the jury inadvertently, or by design, removes a paper
from the courtroom without the authority of the court and it is shown
that consideration of the written material influenced the jury to the detri-
ment of one of the parties, that there would be such material "miscon-
duct" to sustain a motion for new trial.28 Likewise, an "error of law"
would not be committed by sending instructions in with the jury as it re-
tires, unless it first be shown that there is a rule of procedure which
prohibits this practice. As shown previously, there is no provision in
the Civil Code which has this effect; and disregarding the dictum found
in Smith v. McMillen, there apparently is no judicial decision which could
be characterized as a prohibition of this practice.
Since it is reasonably arguable that there is no legal foundation for
the predominant practice in Indiana trial courts prohibiting the jury from
taking the written instructions as it retires, support for this practice is
found mainly on the level of policy considerations. If flexibility is recog-
nized in regard to the availability of instructions as the jury retires, the
logical approach in selecting the better practice would be to evaluate com-
peting policy considerations in light of an accurate record indicating a
jury's actual treatment of written instructions. But it must be recog-
nized that the sanctity of the jury room renders the obtaining of such a
record impracticable,2" and thereby makes it difficult to reach an ir-
26. Ibid.
27. See e.g., Jones v. State, 89 Ind. 82 (1883) (Indiana Reports containing a for-
mer appeal); Toohy v. Sarvis, 78 Ind. 474 (1881) (letter attached to a deposition);
Lotz v. Briggs, 50 Ind. 346 (1875) (record of former action between same parties);
Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (1871) (notes taken by juror) ; Newkirk v. State, 27 Ind. 1
(1866) (Bishop's Criminal Law).
28. See e.g., McClanahan v. State, 233 Ind. 365, 118 N.E.2d 434 (1954) ; Bersch v.
State, 13 Ind. 434 (1859) ; Ball v. Carley, 3 Ind. 577 (1852) ; Indianapolis Power and
Light Co. v. Moore, 103 Ind. App. 53, 5 N.E.2d 118 (1937) ; Ohio & Mississippi Ry. v.
Hill, 7 Ind. App. 255, 34 N.E. 646 (1893).
29. The sanctity of the jury's deliberation has been criticized as a factor which
insures irresponsibility of the jury in a civil trial. See Kingdon, True Verdicts?, 23
J. Am. JtJD. Soc'Y 190 (1940). In order that a more accurate evaluation of the jury
system may be accomplished, it has been suggested that jury deliberations be recorded,
transcribed and filed with the verdict. See Glaston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations,
29 A.B.A.J. 195 (1943). Currently, the University of Chicago Law School is conduct-
ing a series of studies of experimental juries to determine how instructions can be made
more intelligible to the jury. Letter from Harry Kalven Jr., Director of Jury Project
at Univ. of Chicago Law School to Indiana Law Journal, April 3, 1957.
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refutable conclusion either for or against the practice of sending written
instructions to the jury room.
As stated previously, the "sharp juror" policy argument employed
in the Smith case has lost most of its persuasiveness in view of the sub-
stantial decrease in illiteracy." This argument was based on the falla-
cious premise that if all jurors could read they would possess equal ability
to properly understand and utilize the written instructions. This fallacy
does suggest a modification of the original Smith v. McMillen reasoning,
which may provide new vigor for the Court's "sharp juror" policy argu-
ment; for, even if all jurors could read there would remain a disparity in
their ability to understand typical instructions which involve a special
vocabulary and complex sentence structure."' Thus, if written instruc-
tions are available to the jury, the resulting modern counterpart of the
"sharp juror," condemned in Smith v. McMillen, might be found in the
juror possessing a superior vocabulary and capacity to analyze difficult
legal sentences. However, this modification of the "sharp juror" argu-
ment loses much of its logical appeal because it is just as possible that a
"sharp juror" may mislead his fellow jurors even though the instruc-
tions are given only in the courtroom.
Less tenuous than the "sharp juror" policy consideration is the posi-
tion that if the jury is permitted to have written instructions, it may
single out a particular instruction, thereby placing undue emphasis either
on a narrow aspect of the case, or on instructions which present only one
side of an important proposition.32 However, again, this abuse of in-
structions cannot be altogether avoided even though the instructions are
withheld from the jury room." Particular instructions would seem to
become more prominent in the individual juror's mind because of em-
phasis, real or imagined, given the instruction by the judge, or because
the juror was particularly interested in the phase of the case covered by
an instruction, or because certain instructions reinforce the juror's pre-
30. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
31. See Littler, Reader Rights in Legal Writing, 25 CAL. B.J. 51 (1950) ; Hulen,
"Twelve Good Men and True": The Forgotten Men of the Courtroom, 38 A.B.A.J. 813,
814 (1952) (comments of jurors on the difficulty of understanding instructions).
32. This policy argument seems to be the controlling factor in several Indiana
trial courts which never permit the jury to receive written instructions. The following
statements of two Indiana trial courts reflect this policy argument: "We do not per-
mit written instructions to go to the jury room for the reason that laymen might mis-
interpret or place too much emphasis on a single instruction." "It has never been my
practice to permit the jury to take written instructions with them for the reason that
it is my feeling that a juror may become attached to one specific instruction and rely
heavily upon that in def ference [sic] to the other instructions ...... " Letters in reply
to a survey of Indiana trial courts to the Board of Editors of the Indiana Law Journal,
May, 1957.
33. See e.g., Searfoss v. Grissom, 85 Ind. App. 691, 693, 155 N.E. 613, 615 (1926).
NOTES
conceived view of the correct verdict in the case.
Although neither the choice of reading the instructions to the jury
in court nor sending the instructions to the jury room guarantees that
the juror will give equal consideration to each instruction, it is arguable
that the better course is to withhold written instructions from the jury
during its deliberation. If the jury were permitted to consult the written
instructions, and should a disagreement arise over a particular instruc-
tion, it would be difficult to direct attention away from the center of the
controversy to other instructions which may easily settle the dispute or
point out other indispensible issues which have been completely over-
looked. The trial court's cautionary instruction that all instructions are
to be given equal weight is probably not an adequate safeguard once the
jury has fixed its attention upon one or two written paragraphs or sen-
tences. 4 On the other hand, the alternative procedure of bringing the
jury into the courtroom and rereading the instructions, should the jury
disagree, would seem to provide at least some assurance that the jury will
consider all the instructions, because under this procedure the court will
normally refuse a request to reread only the disputed instruction, but will
reread the instructions in their entirety. 5 Moreover, this procedure pro-
vides an additional exposure to the entire charge which may broaden the
jury's consideration to include instructions theretofore ignored or hastily
discarded in the heat of the deliberation.
Another policy objection to the jury's having written instructions is
that the jury may shift its attention from its principal job of determining
issues of fact to that of disputing the meaning of particular words of
phrases in the instructions. 6 However, it is difficult to visualize instruc-
tions drafted with absolute clarity of expression and lacking ambiguity."
In order that a jury composed of twelve individual minds may arrive at a
collective understanding of legal concepts involved in instructions, it is
34. See e.g., Gholston v. Gholston, 31 Ga. 625 (1860).
35. See e.g., Searfoss v. Grissom, 85 Ind. App. 691, 693, 155 N.E. 613, 615 (1926)
2 GAvrT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 338 (1942). There is evidence that many
trial courts are willing to reread a particular disputed instruction; but, counsel for the
parties will seldom agree to anything less than a rereading of all instructions. Letters
in reply to a survey of Indiana trial courts to the Board of Editors of the Indiana Law
Journal, May, 1957.
36. See CAL. LAW REvIsION Co.mm'N, Recommendations and Study Relating to
Taking Instructions to the Jury Room, at C-12 (1956).
37. The difficulty the jury may encounter in understanding instructions is perhaps
overstated by one conscientious trial judge, "Still, after half a century, we find our-
selves in the embarrassing position in regard to instructions to the jury in plain, auto-
mobile accident cases in which lawyers do not know how to write instructions, the
trial judges do not know whether or not they are correct, and only God understands
them." Hulen, "Twelve Good Men and True": The Forgotten Men of the Courtroom,
38 A.B.A.J. 813, 814 (1952).
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perhaps desirable that the meaning of specific language be vigorously
debated. Moreover, the possibility that such debate would result in in-
terminable confusion in the jury room would seem to be greatly reduced
by existing statutory procedure which permits the jury to request that
it be brought back into the courtroom if it desires to be informed
as to any point of law arising in the case. 8
In jurisdictions which require or permit written instructions to be
taken into the jury room as the jury retires, the primary reason advanced
for such a practice is the desire to provide a practical method of avoiding
errors of memory and to give the jury a better opportunity to understand
the precise terms of the instructions. 9 The logical appeal of this practice
is apparent. Instructions must be designed to serve an omnibus purpose;
and, even a cursory examination of the scope and content of the court's
charge indicates the enormity of the burden placed upon the juror's ca-
pacity to remember. One analyst has suggested that twenty-one matters
are normally covered.4" In many cases the sheer volume of instructions
makes it inconceivable that jurors can remember more than isolated frag-
ments of the whole.4 ' Moreover, the juror's memory is perhaps even less
trustworthy when statements of amounts and figures are included in the
instructions.2
However, it is arguable that in Indiana courts the necessity of send-
ing the instructions with the jury is questionable in view of the Civil
Code provision that the jury may have the instructions reread in the
38. See note 13 supra.
39. Dissatisfaction with overreliance upon the juror's memory of instructions is
apparent in each of the following decisions approving the practice of sending of written
instructions to the jury room: "We see no good reason why the members of a jury
should always be required to debate and rely upon their several recollections of what thejudge said when proof of what he said is readily available." Copeland v. U.S., 80 U.S.
App. D.C. 308, 152 F.2d 769, 770 (1945). "[W]e think it was not only permissible but
commendable for the court to . . . [permit the jury to have the written instructions].
The purpose of instructions is to advise the jury as to the law, and at all times in
considering its verdict a jury should keep them in mind. We can think of no better
method of enabling it to do this than to have the written instructions of the court al-
ways before it." Valley Nat. Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 504, 121 P.2d 414, 420
(1942). "But why should the jurors be deprived, when they retire to make up their
verdict, of the very papers and documents upon which their verdict must to a great
extent depend? We are unable to discover any substantial reason." State v. Tompkins,
71 Mo. 613, 617 (1880). "And the only result of allowing them [the jury] to examine
it [the court's charge] for themselves would seem to be, that they would know more
thoroughly its precise terms than they could if compelled to trust entirely to recollec-
tion after hearing it read once." Wood v. Aldrich, 25 Wis. 695, 696 (1870).
40. See Diamond, Instructions to Juries, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE (1946-51).
41. See .eg., Emry v. Beaver, 192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922) (45 instructions
covering 27 pages of printed brief) ; Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Carmichael, 37 Ind. App.
413, 73 N.E. 935 (1905) (37 instructions); 1 THORNTON, INDIANA INSTRUCTIONS TO
JURIES, § 14 (1914).
42. See e.g., Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Sullivan, 86 Ga. 50, 60, 12 S.E. 216, 221
(1890).
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courtroom to refresh its memory." On the other hand, this practice may
be unrealistic in assuming that by listening to the judge intone the in-
structions the jury can gain a working knowledge of the law embodied
in the instructions. Furthermore, it is met by the argument that if the
jury is to be effectively guided and controlled by instructions, it should
be afforded a realistic opportunity to know the content of the instruc-
tions, and should be permitted to exercise fully its intelligence in arriving
at a reasonable construction of the language therein." The fact that the
legal concepts and terminology involved often confuse experienced law-
yers who draft the instructions and the learned judge who must rule on
their validity would seem to strengthen this argument.
Economy of time has been suggested as another advantage to
furnishing the jury a copy of the instructions as it retires. Since counsel
will usually demand that the instructions be reduced to writing,4" no ad-
ditional time would be consumed in placing a copy of the instructions
among the papers available to the jury as it retires."5 It is suggested that
this practice would at all times afford the jury an accurate record of the
instructions, thereby eliminating the necessity of conducting the jury back
to the courtroom should a dispute arise concerning the form or content of
the judge's charge.
A practice which would accelerate jury trials and thereby alleviate
congested dockets is attractive; but, it would seem that the ultimate cri-
terion for evaluating a proposed improvement of the instruction pro-
cedure is not one of economy of time, but rather one of certainty in the
understanding of the instructions. But even if an evaluation of the al-
ternative practices was based solely upon economy of time, it is doubtful
if there is such a disparity of time so as to overwhelmingly favor placing
the instructions in the hands of the jury as it retires. Although a com-
parison of the mechanics of the alternative procedures indicates a pos-
sible disparity in time consumed, whether in actual practice the time spent
in conducting the jury into the courtroom is significant remains un-
certain. Indiana juries return to the courtroom to have the instructions
43. See note 13 supra.
44. See note 39 supra.
45. There is evidence that Indiana trial courts generally reduce the instructions to
writing upon their own motion, although counsel for neither party makes the request
under IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-2008, 2-2010 (Burns 1946). Letters in reply to a survey of
Indiana trial courts to the Board of Editors of the Indiana Law Journal, May, 1957.
46. The United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana has adopted
the practice of making a tape recording of the instructions available to the jury in most
civil cases. Conditions are stipulated for the jury's use of the tape recording. These
conditions are: (1) that the recording be sent to the jury room only in the event the
jury wants to hear the instructions again; (2) that the instructions be played back in
their entirety; and (3) that unless permission is given by the court, the recording may
be heard no more than two times.
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reread on the average of one case in six." The ratio of the time con-
sumed in conducting a single jury into the courtroom and rereading a
single set of instructions to the total time consumed by six complete jury
trials would seem to be negligible.
Those who favor giving instructions to the jury as it retires point
out that the whole doctrine of qualification of one instruction by another
is without value unless the jury can read and compare the instructions to
determine whether one instruction in a series of instructions modifies or
qualifies another in the same series.4" It is questionable, however,
whether the average jury, untrained in law, can intelligently make such
a determination, for its treatment of the instructions in arriving at a
general verdict is probably not sensitive enough to appreciate the legal
complexities involved in the doctrine.
The policy considerations outlined above represent the basic argu-
ments for and against adopting a liberal procedure permitting the jury to
have the written instructions during its deliberation. In summary, the
arguments against this procedure seem to be based essentially upon the
negative theory that the jury cannot handle instructions effectively un-
less it is denied direct contact with the written words of the instructions
and is, in effect, forced to rely upon a vague understanding of the general
import of the instructions. And, on the other hand, proponents of this
procedure anticipate a jury which would be greatly benefited by an op-
portunity to carefully analyze the instructions.
The contrasting policy arguments which account for the diametric-
ally opposed procedures found in Indiana and other jurisdictions also
raise the broader issue of whether the jury is capable of an intelligent
application of instructions regardless of the procedure adopted.49 Those
who are affronted by an attack on the jury's ability suggest that judges
and lawyers who draft instructions are primarily responsible for the dif-
ficulties juries encounter in dealing with instructions." Undoubtedly,
47. See Survey, part II (3) (a).
48. See Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Hanthorn, 211 Ill. 367, 373, 71 N.E. 1022,
1024 (1904).
49. Jerome Frank bases his "realistic" theory of the function of the jury upon
"[W]hat everyone can discover by questioning the average person who has served as a
juror-namely that often the jury are neither able to, nor do they attempt to, apply the
instructions of the court." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 111 (1949). Other observers of
the modern jury system seriously question the jury's ability to properly utilize the court's
instructions. See Kingdon, True Verdicts?, 23 J. Ams. JuD. Soc'Y 190, 191 (1940) ; Os-
born, The Mind of the Jitror 8 (1937).
50. One Indiana judge is of the opinion that instructions are used by lawyers to
test the trial courts' knowledge of the law and that, beyond certain simple "horse sense"
instructions, they are "nothing more than a vehicle by which lawers are in a position to
try and trick or trap the trial court into creating a reversible error." Letter in reply
to a survey of Indiana trial courts to the Board of Editors of the Indiana Law Journal,
May, 1957.
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the deficiencies of both the jury and the instructions contribute to the
problems attending the instructional phase of jury trials. Unless the
suggestion that jury trials be abandoned altogether in civil cases is the
ultimate solution, the proper approach to the dilemma requires a coordi-
nated effort by the Legislature, the courts, and the bar to improve both
the quality of the jury and the content and form of the instructions. No
less important to the proper functioning of instructions is the adoption
of a procedure which will insure that instructions afford intelligible legal
guidance to the jury, give the parties adequate opportunity to submit
legal theories, and provide the court the necessary supervision of the
jury's deliberation and verdict.
APPENDIX
PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES
No
State Required Permitted Authority Authority
Alabama x ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 273 (1940);
Miller v. Hampton, 37 Ala. *342
(1861); Polly v. McCall 37 Ala. 20
(1860).
Arizona x Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz.
491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942).
Arkansas x Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Watt, 186 Ark.
86, 52 S.W.2d 634 (1932) (by impli-
cation).
California x Fererira v. Silvey, 38 Cal. App. 346,
176 Pac. 371 (1918) (by implication).




Georgia x Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Sullivan,
86 Ga. 50, 12 S.E. 213 (did not fol-
low Gholston v. Gholston, 31 Ga. 625
(1860) prohibiting instructions in the
jury room).
Idaho InAnO CoDE ANN. § 10-206 (1948)
(unless party objects) ; Hilbert v.
Spokane R.R., 20 Idaho 54, 116 Pac.
1116 (1911).
Illinois x ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 110, § 67 (Smith-
Hurd 1956).
Iowa x Head v. Lansworthy, 15 Iowa 235
(1863).
Kansas x Moyer v. Dolese Bros. Co., 162 Kan.







Michigan x Behrendt v. Wilcox, 277 Mich. 232,





























MIss. CODE ANN. § 1530 (1942).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 29.2016 (1949)
Security Say. Bank v. Green, 281
S.W. 137 (1926).
Hammond v. Foster, 4 Mont. 421, 433,
1 Pac. 757, 759 (1882) (if any are
given all must be given).
Langworthy v. Connelly 14 Neb. 340,
15 N.W. 737 (1883) (by implication).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-1, rule 51(c)
(1953) (upon request of either party).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-182 (1951) (if
instructions are in writing and if re-
quested by either party).
N.D. REv. CODE vol. 3, § 28.1411
(1943) (if in writing) ; Ley v. Gulke,
58 N.D. 727, 227 N.W. 222 (1929).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.01
(Page 1955) (written instructions).
Lowenstein v. Holmes, 40 Okla. 33,
37, 135 Pac. 727, 729 (1913).
ORE. RFv. STAT. § 17.255 (1955) (if
requested by party).
S.D. CODE § 33.1317 (1939).
Tax. STAT., Rule Civ. Proc. 281
(Vernon, 1948).
UTAH CODE ANN., Rule Civ. Proc.
47(m) (1953).
Wash. RULES PLEAD., PROC. & PRAC.,
RULE 8, 34A Wash.2d 74 (1951).
Wiseman v. Ryan, 116 W. Va. 525,
182 S.E. 670 (1935).
Wood v. Aldrich, 25 Wis. 695 (1870).Wisconsin
Wyoming
